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DEBATE 
 
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND CORPORATE LIABILITY 
In 2010, the Second Circuit decided Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 
holding that corporations are not proper defendants under the Alien 
Tort Statute. Invoking Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Second Circuit 
found that human rights abuses committed by corporations were not 
sufficiently definite under international law to warrant jurisdiction in 
United States courts. Several other circuits have explicitly disagreed 
with the Second Circuit, however, and on October 17, 2011, the Su-
preme Court granted cert in Kiobel. Professor Farbstein and Professor 
Giannini argue that Kiobel is an outlier, comparing the logic and 
strength of its arguments to those in the Seventh and D.C. Circuits as 
well as the dissenting opinions in both the original decision and the 
Second Circuit’s 5-5 decision to deny rehearing en banc. Professor 
Arend expands their argument by highlighting two particular failings 
of the Second Circuit’s position. First, he argues that Kiobel misinter-
prets Sosa, relying on a distinction between state and non-state actors 
to find that there are different classes of defendants under the Alien 
Tort Statute. Second, Arend concurs with Farbstein’s and Giannini’s 
analysis that corporations have historically been found capable of vi-
olating international law.  
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Will Kiobel Be Just an Aberration? 
Susan Farbstein† & Tyler Giannini††
 After granting certiorari on October 17, 2011, the Supreme Court 
will soon tell us whether Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. is in fact an 
outlier—an aberration—in more than fifteen years of corporate Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS) litigation.
 
1
 
†
 Susan Farbstein is a Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School and the Associate Clini-
cal Director of its Human Rights Program.  As a member of the legal team in Wiwa v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the companion case to Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. that 
successfully settled in 2009, she was selected as a finalist for the 2010 Trial Lawyer of 
the Year Award.   
  See 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (inter-
preting 28 U.S.C. § 1350).  The Second Circuit surprised the legal 
world with its Kiobel decision in September 2010.  In a case brought by 
Nigerian plaintiffs against Royal Dutch/Shell for crimes against hu-
manity and extrajudicial killing, the panel ruled, 2-1, that corpora-
tions could not be held liable under the ATS.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145.  
In the initial months that followed the decision, Kiobel provoked pre-
dictions of the end of corporate ATS litigation.  However, since Kiobel 
came down, no other appellate court has adopted the Second Cir-
cuit’s views.  Rather, the opinion precipitated a wave of activity from 
other appellate courts rebuking the Second Circuit’s conclusions and 
isolating its reasoning.  These decisions show that among the circuit 
courts Kiobel is—to use Judge Richard Posner’s word—an “outlier.”  
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 
2011); accord Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, Nos. 02–56256, 02–56390, 09–
56381, 2011 WL 5041927, at *20 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2011) (en banc); 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Rome-
††
 Tyler Giannini is a Clinical Professor at Harvard Law School and the Clinical Direc-
tor of the Human Rights Program.  He has litigated Alien Tort Statute (ATS) cases for 
more than fifteen years, including while working with EarthRights International, an 
organization that he co-founded.  In that capacity, Giannini served as one of the archi-
tects of Doe v. Unocal Corp., a precedent-setting corporate ATS suit that settled in 2005.  
Farbstein and Giannini are currently co-counsel in two ATS cases and have submitted 
amicus curiae briefs in numerous other matters, including in support of the Kiobel ap-
pellants’ petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.  The authors would like to thank 
Sarah Poppy Alexander for her valuable comments and assistance with this piece. 
1 The 1789 statute allows non-U.S. citizens to sue in U.S. courts for violations of 
international law. 
FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2011  5:28 PM 
2011] The Alien Tort Statute and Corporate Liability 101 
ro v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); see also 
Aziz v. Alcolac Inc., No. 10-1908, 2011 WL 4349356, at *5 n.6 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 19, 2011) (declining to reach question of corporate liability and 
dismissing on alternative grounds).  The Supreme Court will soon re-
solve the widening circuit split caused by this flurry of recent appellate 
decisions on the corporate liability issue. 
Since the Second Circuit’s seminal Filártiga decision in 1980, the 
ATS has become an increasingly important tool for survivors of gross 
human rights abuse to seek redress for their harms.  See Filártiga v. 
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  Kiobel marked a significant 
departure from the spirit of Filártiga, as well as a long line of ATS cases 
dating to the mid-1990s—including within the Second Circuit—that 
had proceeded against corporations.  This history partially explains 
why the initial cracks in Kiobel’s edifice came not from other circuits 
but from within the Second Circuit itself.  The first sign that Kiobel had 
missed the mark was Judge Leval’s blistering rebuttal that dissected 
the flaws in the majority’s approach and pointed out the broader im-
plications of the decision:  “By adopting the corporate form, such an 
enterprise could have hired itself out to operate Nazi extermination 
camps or the torture chambers of Argentina’s dirty war, immune from 
civil liability to its victims.”  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 150 (Leval, J., concur-
ring).  Judge Leval noted that, in addition to the logical shortcomings 
of the majority’s opinion and the perverse outcomes it would create, 
the decision undermined a central purpose of international law arti-
culated in Filártiga:  “By protecting profits earned through abuse of 
fundamental human rights protected by international law, the rule my 
colleagues have created operates in opposition to the objective of in-
ternational law to protect those rights.”  Id. 
In February 2011, in a 5-5 vote, the Second Circuit denied a peti-
tion for rehearing en banc in Kiobel.  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co., 642 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2011).  Accompanying this vote, 
the divided circuit published an extraordinary exchange of views that 
revealed additional weaknesses in the opinion.  Judge Katzmann, who 
did not sit on the original Kiobel panel, dissented from the decision 
not to rehear the case.  He specifically emphasized that the majority’s 
reliance on his earlier opinion in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank 
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 (2d Cir. 2007), was misplaced with regard to 
the question of corporate liability.  Judge Katzmann understood that 
decision to be consistent with the principle “that corporations, like 
natural persons, may be liable for violations of the law of nations” un-
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der the ATS.  Kiobel, 642 F.3d at 381 (Katzmann, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing). 
Further, in voting against rehearing, Judge Jacobs authored an 
opinion indicating that he joined the initial panel decision for policy 
reasons, not legal ones.  He claimed that “[e]xamples of corporations 
in the atrocity business are few in history,” thus minimizing the con-
cern that corporations would participate in human rights abuses, and 
stated the view that “the underlying question of law is one of no big 
consequence. . . . The incremental number of cases actually forec-
losed by the majority opinion in Kiobel approaches the vanishing 
point.”  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270-71 
(2d Cir. 2011) (Jacobs, J., concurring in denial of rehearing).  Judge 
Cabranes, who authored the original panel decision, felt compelled to 
pen a separate opinion in response to Judge Jacobs, explaining that 
“fidelity to the law, not a ‘policy agenda,’ dictated the majority opi-
nion.”  Id. at 272 (Cabranes, J., concurring in denial of rehearing). 
The subsequent ATS decisions issued by the D.C. and Seventh 
Circuits this summer firmly rejected Kiobel’s logic and holding, noting 
numerous flaws in the court’s reasoning.  However, three particular 
shortcomings stand out.  First, the other appellate decisions recog-
nized that in asking whether there is a universal practice of imposing 
civil liability on corporations that violate international law, the Kiobel 
decision fundamentally misstated the structure of international law.  
In the Firestone opinion, Judge Posner emphasized “the distinction be-
tween a principle of [customary international] law, which is a matter 
of substance, and the means of enforcing it, which is a matter of pro-
cedure or remedy.”  Firestone, 643 F.3d at 1019.  The Kiobel court erred 
in looking to international law to discern a norm of corporate liability 
because, as Judge Posner explained, “[i]nternational law imposes 
substantive obligations and the individual nations decide how to en-
force them.”  Id. at 1020.  The D.C. Circuit similarly recognized that 
the Kiobel court’s analysis “conflates the norms of conduct at issue in 
[Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)] and the rules for any 
remedy to be found in federal common law.”  Exxon, 654 F.3d at 41; 
see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring). 
Second, both the D.C. and Seventh Circuits noted that the histori-
cal premise underlying the Kiobel opinion is incorrect.  The Kiobel ma-
jority asserted that even the most heinous corporate behavior—
assistance in perpetrating the Holocaust—was not punished under in-
ternational law because no corporation was prosecuted in the criminal 
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trials at Nuremberg.  However, as Judge Posner explained, at the end 
of the Second World War the allied powers dissolved German corpo-
rations that had supported the Nazi effort “on the authority of custo-
mary international law.”  Firestone, 643 F.3d at 1017; see also Exxon, 654 
F.3d at 51-52.  Control Council Law No. 9, which provided for the sei-
zure of property owned by I.G. Farben, found that the company had 
“knowingly and prominently engaged in building up and maintaining 
the German war potential,” and ordered that some of its seized assets 
be made “available for reparations.”  Firestone, 643 F.3d at 1017. 
Third, Judge Posner emphasized the common sense reasons why 
the Kiobel opinion falls short.  According to the Kiobel ruling, “a pirate 
can be sued under the Alien Tort Statute but not a pirate corporation 
(Pirates of the Indian Ocean, Inc., with its headquarters and principal 
place of business in Somalia).”  Id.  Judge Leval similarly noted the 
consequences of this outcome in his own opinion in Kiobel:  “So long 
as they incorporate . . . businesses will now be free to trade in or ex-
ploit slaves, employ mercenary armies to do dirty work for despots, 
perform genocides or operate torture prisons for a despot’s political 
opponents, or engage in piracy—all without civil liability to victims.”  
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 150 (Leval, J., concurring). 
Despite its clear rejection by other appellate courts, Kiobel none-
theless remains troubling, in part because it comes from the circuit 
where the modern era of ATS cases began.  See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 
878.  Dolly Filártiga brought that first case on behalf of her seventeen-
year-old brother, who was tortured and killed by Paraguyan police.  To 
her, the opinion signaled that the United States was a country “where 
human rights are respected, where there is a way to bring to justice 
people who have committed horrible atrocities.”  Dolly Filártiga, Op-
Ed., American Courts, Global Justice, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 2004, at A21.  
The Second Circuit has traditionally provided opportunities for survi-
vors to seek redress for violations of international law, which was ex-
actly what the court intended when it issued Filártiga:  “Our holding 
today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First 
Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless 
dream to free all people from brutal violence.”  Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 
890.  As the D.C., Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have recognized, the 
ATS continues to allow survivors to pursue accountability—whether 
such violence is perpetrated at the hands of an individual or with the 
assistance of a corporation.  This explains why it will be no surprise if 
the Supreme Court follows the spirit of Filártiga when it rules on Kiobel 
and confirms that Judge Cabranes’s decision was simply an outlier. 
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REBUTTAL 
The Supreme Court Should Overturn Kiobel 
Anthony Clark Arend†
 
 
On Monday, October 17, 2011, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 
(2d Cir. 2010).  This is not surprising.  As Professors Farbstein and 
Giannini explain in their excellent Opening Statement, since the 
Second Circuit ruled in Kiobel that corporate liability did not obtain 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, both the D.C. 
and Seventh Circuits have taken a contrary view.  See Doe v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone 
Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011). 
While it is always difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will re-
solve the split in the circuits, I am inclined to think that the Court will 
reject Kiobel for several reasons—many of which have already been de-
scribed by Farbstein and Giannini.  But let me highlight two in particular. 
First, I believe that the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel funda-
mentally misinterprets the Supreme Court ruling in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  In Sosa, the Supreme Court set forth 
the standard to determine whether a violation of a putative norm of 
customary international law rose to the level of a “‘tort . . . in violation 
of the law of nations’” for purposes of the ATS.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698-
99 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350).  In the course of a discussion on “the 
determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a 
cause of action,” id. at 732, the Supreme Court notes in a footnote 
that a “related consideration is whether international law extends the 
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator be-
ing sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or 
individual.”  Id. at 732 n.20.  For some reason, the Second Circuit 
latched onto this note to indicate that international law provides some 
form of standard about liability for different types of juridical persons.  
Referring to the footnote, the Second Circuit claims:  “That language 
requires that we look to international law to determine our jurisdic-
tion over ATS claims against a particular class of defendant, such as 
corporations.”  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127 (emphasis omitted).  But if one 
 
†
Professor of Government and Foreign Service; Director, Master of Science in 
Foreign Service Program; Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University. 
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continues to read the Sosa footnote, it becomes clear that the Court 
was not suggesting that there was an international law standard re-
garding the differentiation of individuals from corporations, but ra-
ther a standard about whether private actors versus state actors could 
be held liable.  (The footnote continues on to compare Judge Ed-
wards’s concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 
791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which detailed an insufficient consensus on 
whether torture by private actors violates international law, with Kadic 
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1995), which found a suffi-
cient consensus  that genocide by private actors violates international 
law.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.)  As the amicus brief of International 
Law Scholars in support of granting certiorari in Kiobel explains, the 
“text [of the footnote] shows that the Court was referring to a single 
class of non-state actors (natural and juristic individuals), not two sep-
arate classes as assumed by the Kiobel panel majority . . . .”  Brief of 
Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of the Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 
10-1491 (U.S. Jul. 13, 2011), 2011 WL 2743197, at *6-7.  Indeed, as the 
International Law Scholars point out, the Supreme Court has pre-
viously noted that the “‘Alien Tort Statute by its terms does not distin-
guish among classes of defendants. . . .’”  Id. at 6 (quoting Argentine 
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989)). 
Second, as Farbstein and Giannini note, there is ample evidence 
to support the proposition that international law clearly recognizes 
that juridical persons, such as corporations, can violate international 
law.  Dating at least as far back as Nuremberg, international law has 
acknowledged that actors other than natural persons can commit vi-
olations of international law.  Indeed, the International Law Scholars 
brief points to a long litany of recent claims to this effect: 
A diverse array of treaties reveals the accepted understanding within the 
international community that corporations have international obliga-
tions and can be held liable for violations of international law.  See, e.g., 
Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 
2005, art. 10(1), C.E.T.S. No. 196 (2005) (“Each Party shall adopt such 
measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to 
establish the liability of legal entities for participation in the offences set 
forth in Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention.”); Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, art. 10(1), 2225 U.N.T.S. 
209 (“Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, 
consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons 
for participation in serious crimes involving an organized criminal group 
and for the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 
of this Convention.”); Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
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Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 
art. 2, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (“Each Party shall take such measures as 
may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the 
liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official.”); Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57; Interna-
tional Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, Nov. 3, 1973 art. I(2), 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (“The States Parties 
to the present Convention declare criminal those organizations, institu-
tions and individuals committing the crime of apartheid.”); International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 
973 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuc-
lear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 (emphasis added in all cas-
es).  There is certainly no rule in international law that corporations, re-
gardless of their relationship with a government, enjoy immunity for 
their state-like or state-related activities, as when they interrogate detai-
nees, provide public security, work weapons systems in armed conflict, or 
run prisons.  As noted by the Special Representative to the U.N. Secre-
tary-General in his summary of international legal principles, the corpo-
rate responsibility to respect human rights includes avoiding complicity, 
which has been most clearly elucidated “in the area of aiding and abet-
ting international crimes, i.e. knowingly providing practical assistance or 
encouragement that has a substantial effect on the commission of a 
crime . . . .”  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business En-
terprises, ¶¶ 73-74, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars, supra, at 11-13. 
But at the end of the day, whether corporate violations of interna-
tional law can be punished in domestic courts through the remedy 
provided by a civil suit is a question that international law leaves to in-
dividual states.  It does not matter whether there is an international 
law “standard” for civil liability for such violations—a point empha-
sized by both the D.C. and Seventh Circuits and highlighted by 
Farbstein and Giannini in their Opening Statement. 
In short, in support of Farbstein and Giannini’s arguments, I be-
lieve that the Supreme Court will, in fact, reject the majority’s con-
clusion in the divided panel in Kiobel and hold that there is civil lia-
bility under the ATS for corporations that commit torts in violation 
of the law of nations. 
But I would be remiss if I did not point to one interesting legal 
thread raised in the D.C. Circuit and in the International Legal Scho-
lars brief—the issue of “general principles of law.”  As will be recalled, 
the Second Circuit based its decision exclusively upon what it deemed 
to be rules of customary international law, concluding that there is no 
rule of customary international law establishing corporate liability for 
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purposes of the ATS.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145.  The D.C. Circuit and the 
amicus brief for the International Law Scholars make an argument that, 
irrespective of whether there is a rule of customary international law, 
there is a general principle of law providing for corporate liability for 
violations of international law.  See Exxon, 654 F.3d at 53; Brief of Amici 
Curiae International Law Scholars, supra, at 14. 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, as is 
well known, lists three main sources of international law:  conventions, 
custom, and “general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions.”  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1(c).  
This last source is the most controversial and unclear in its meaning. 
See ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
49-53 (1999).  One of the most widely accepted meanings of general 
principles is that the term refers to “general principles of law that are 
common to the domestic legal systems of states.”  Id. at 49.  And it is 
this meaning that the D.C. Circuit applies in Doe v. Exxon.  The court 
notes that “the Kiobel majority overlooked general principles of inter-
national law as a proper source for the content of international law,” 
Exxon, 654 F.3d at 53, and concludes that “[g]eneral principles of in-
ternational law . . . offer further support that corporate responsibility 
for the conduct of its agents under a principle of respondeat superior is 
recognized in the law of nations,” id. at 54. 
So here is the question:  will the Supreme Court venture into a 
discussion of general principles of law?  If so, it would make a signifi-
cant contribution to international legal jurisprudence on this source 
of international law.  As far as I can tell, with the possible exception of 
a passing reference in a footnote in United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89, 
103 n.18 (1986), the Supreme Court has never addressed the nature 
of general principles of law. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
 
Kiobel Ignores History in Creating a Corporate Carve-Out  
 
SUSAN FARBSTEIN & TYLER GIANNINI†
 
 
Professor Arend’s excellent piece amplifies an important point:  as 
explained in our Opening Statement, the Second Circuit’s Kiobel deci-
sion is an outlier among the circuit courts.  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (interpreting the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350).  Since the mid-1990s,, courts have 
allowed ATS cases to proceed against corporations.  While these cases 
have been hotly contested on numerous fronts, including the proper 
standard for aiding and abetting liability, the idea that corporations 
could be generally exempt from liability was not a central battle in 
ATS litigation until Kiobel.  This may well be because the drafters of 
the ATS themselves never contemplated a corporate carve-out.  Courts 
before Kiobel rightly understood that if a nonstate actor could be held 
to account for violations of international law, then that actor could be 
a private individual or a corporation.  As Judge Richard Posner from 
the Seventh Circuit noted in his 2011 Firestone opinion, “All but one of 
the cases at our level hold or assume (mainly the latter) that corpora-
tions can be liable.”  Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 
1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011). 
Of perhaps equal importance, the Kiobel opinion is deeply incon-
sistent with the history, text, and purpose of the ATS.  Our amicus 
brief on behalf of legal historians, submitted in support of the petition 
for certiorari in Kiobel, explains why the First Congress crafted the 
ATS.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History William R. 
Casto, Martin S. Flaherty, Robert W. Gordon, Nasser Hussain, and 
John V. Orth in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Jun. 17, 2011), 2011 WL 2472743.  The 
statute, enacted in 1789, was a significant component of the Founders’ 
efforts to ensure that the young United States would comply with its 
obligation to uphold, respect, and enforce the law of nations.  The 
Framers sought a federal forum to discharge this duty because states—
and state courts in particular—had proven ineffective.  Through the 
statute, the drafters intended to create a meaningful civil remedy 
 
†
 The authors would like to thank Russell Kornblith for his valuable comments and as-
sistance with this piece.   
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(“tort only”) for aliens harmed by violations of the law of nations.  The 
statute extends this remedy to “all causes,” confirming congressional 
intent to provide plaintiffs with broad remedies.  Tellingly, the text of 
the ATS restricts the identity of the plaintiff but places no limit on the 
type of defendant subject to suit.  To now read such a corporate ex-
ception into the statute runs counter to both the Framers’ broad re-
medial intent and the statute’s plain text. 
Juridical entities were held liable for violations of the law of na-
tions in national courts before and after the passage of the ATS.  As 
Judge Posner noted, “if precedent for imposing liability for a violation 
of customary international law by an entity that does not breathe is 
wanted, we point to in rem judgments against pirate ships.”  Firestone, 
643 F.3d at 1021 (citing The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233-
34 (1844); The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40-41 (1825)).  
Furthermore, the East India Company was subject to tort liability long 
before the ATS’s enactment.  See, e.g., Skinner v. East India Co., 
(1666) 6 State Trials 710 (H.L.) 711 (Eng.) (allocating losses against 
the company for violations of the law of nations because failure to 
remedy acts “odious and punishable by all laws of God and man” 
would constitute a “failure of justice”). 
Attempts to hold corporations liable under the ATS emerged in 
the mid-1990s.  For example, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d 
Cir. 2002), was filed in New York in 1993.  Like many of the early 
modern corporate ATS cases, it involved allegations that a corporation 
entered into a business relationship with a repressive regime to facili-
tate natural resource extraction knowing that human rights abuses 
would result.  The plaintiffs represented a class of Ecuadorians who 
claimed that Texaco’s business operations had seriously damaged the 
environment and their health.  In response, the defendant asserted 
that a U.S. court was not an appropriate forum, and argued for dis-
missal on the ground of forum non conveniens.  Critically, as in many 
other corporate suits that would follow, primary litigation questions 
concerned not whether the corporate defendant could be held liable, 
but where.  Id. at 475; see also Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 446 
(2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 99-108 
(2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 158-59 (2d Cir. 1998). 
In 1997, Doe v. Unocal Corp. became the first corporate case to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss.  395 F.3d 932, 962 (9th Cir. 2002).  The 
plaintiffs, Burmese villagers, asserted that Unocal hired the Burmese 
military to provide security for a gas pipeline despite its knowledge 
that the military had a record of human rights abuse.  The Burmese 
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villagers alleged that they were subject to murder, forced labor, rape, 
and torture at the hands of the Burmese military when Unocal and its 
partners proceeded to construct the pipeline through their villages.  
The battleground in Unocal was not whether corporations could be 
held accountable for violations of international law, but rather under 
what legal standard.  Specifically, the litigants and the court confronted 
the question of the standard of liability for corporations that aid and 
abet violations of international law.  This debate included several ques-
tions that became central to many corporate ATS cases in subsequent 
years:  whether the mens rea for aiding and abetting should be drawn 
from international law or federal common law, and whether the appli-
cable standard should be purpose or knowledge.  See, e.g., Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). 
Prior to Kiobel, the modern era of corporate ATS cases had cen-
tered on these unresolved debates.  For more than a decade, numer-
ous courts considered ATS cases without questioning the foundational 
issue of whether corporate liability was permissible under the statute.  
See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009); 
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 564 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008); Sarei 
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008); Aldana v. Del Monte 
Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005); Alperin v. Vati-
can Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005); Herero People’s Reparations 
Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, 370 F.3d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Deutsch v. 
Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003); Doe, 395 F.3d at 932, va-
cated on other grounds, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
Even the Second Circuit, prior to Kiobel, routinely adjudicated 
ATS suits against corporations.  See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 254; Bano v. Union 
Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696 (2d Cir. 2004); Flores v. S. Peru Copper 
Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003); Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 470; Bigio, 
239 F.3d at 440; Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 88; Jota, 157 F.3d at 153.  In short, 
the modern era of corporate ATS cases prior to Kiobel parallels the 
much earlier history:  simply excluding an important class of defen-
dants from suit was anathema to holding responsible parties to account. 
One important Second Circuit case, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., was filed in 1996 on behalf of Nigerian plaintiffs and presented 
facts substantially similar to those in Kiobel.  226 F.3d at 88.  The plain-
tiffs sued the company for conspiring with the Nigerian military and 
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supporting the military’s commission of human rights violations, in-
cluding the violent repression and extrajudicial killing of peaceful 
protestors who opposed environmental degradation.  While Royal 
Dutch Petroleum maintained it was not responsible for the alleged vi-
olations, dismissal on the grounds that corporations were generally 
exempt from liability for human rights violations was never contem-
plated.  In 2009, Royal Dutch Petroleum agreed to settle plaintiffs’ 
claims for $15.5 million. 
The 2010 dismissal of Kiobel thus presents an especially striking 
contrast.  The outcomes for the Wiwa and Kiobel plaintiffs could not be 
more different:  one set received a modicum of justice through a set-
tlement; the other, nothing.  The Second Circuit’s ruling, which de-
nied the Kiobel plaintiffs an opportunity even to seek a remedy for 
their injuries, belies the history of the statute, its broad remedial pur-
pose, and fifteen years of jurisprudence.  The decision creates an ex-
emption from liability solely through incorporation.  The Supreme 
Court should correct this error and bring the case law back in line 
with both the history of the ATS and its modern jurisprudence. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
 
Judge Leval Got It Right  
 
ANTHONY CLARK AREND 
 
It is difficult to add anything to Professors Giannini and 
Farbstein’s succinct, well-argued Closing Statement.  All three of us 
agree that Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. is an outlier and that the 
Supreme Court should reverse the Second Circuit’s conclusion that 
corporate liability does not obtain under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS).  621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1350).  
Judge Leval, in his concurrence from the majority in the panel deci-
sion on Kiobel, sums it up very well.  He concludes: 
I cannot, however, join the majority’s creation of an unprecedented 
concept of international law that exempts juridical persons from com-
pliance with its rules.  The majority’s rule conflicts with two centuries of 
federal precedent on the ATS, and deals a blow to the efforts of interna-
tional law to protect human rights. 
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 196 (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment).  
Despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance to tread too deeply in the 
water of the ATS, I expect they will reject the lower court’s ruling 
on corporate liability.  Such a decision from the Court will open 
federal courts to many similar suits and prevent corporations from 
hiding beyond a veil that has been the recent creation of only a 
single appellate court. 
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